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NOTE
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EL PASO/NEW
MEXICO INTERSTATE GROUNDWATER
CONTROVERSY-THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
NEW MEXICO'S NEW MUNICIPALITY WATER
PLANNING STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
In December 1987, the New Mexico State Engineer denied all of the
City of El Paso, Texas' applications to appropriate groundwater from
aquifers inside the state borders of New Mexico.' The State Engineer
relied on New Mexico's recently enacted forty-year municipality planning
statute which restricts municipal water rights applicants to forty year water
use planning horizons.2 The State Engineer's denial is the most recent
development in the long-standing controversy between the State of New
Mexico and El Paso concerning the City's applications.
In January 1988, El Paso filed suit challenging the constitutionality of
the new statute and the State Engineer's decision as impermissible in-
terference with interstate commerce.' After Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas, a state's regulation and allocation of its water resources must
not unreasonably or excessively burden interstate access to water.4 This
note will analyze the constitutionality of New Mexico's forty-year mu-
nicipality planning statute and the State Engineer's decision under the
statute.
1. In the Matter of the Applications of the City of El Paso, Texas, Nos. HU-12 through HU-71
and LRG-92 through LRG-357, State Engineer Findings and Order (Dec. 23, 1987) [hereinafter
State Engineer Findings and Order, Dec. 23, 19871.
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1985). The statute provides: "Municipalities, counties
and public utilities supplying water to municipalities or counties shall be allowed a water use planning
period not to exceed forty years, and water rights for municipalities, counties and public utilities
supplying water to such municipalities or counties shall be based upon a water development plan
the implementation of which shall not exceed a forty-year period from the date of the application
for an appropriation or a change of place or purpose of use pursuant to a water development plan
or for preservation of a municipal or county water supply for reasonably projected additional needs
within forty years." Id. § 72-1-9(B).
3. The City of El Paso v. S.E. Reynolds, No. 80-730-HB (D.N.M. filed Jan. 12, 1988). The
City has challenged the statute as a deliberate effort to deny El Paso's water permit applications.
Id. at 14. El Paso has also asserted that the statute operates to deny the City equal protection and
due process, Id. at 22, 23. These two additional constitutional challenges, however, are outside the
scope of this note.
4. 458 U.S. 941 (1982). The Sporhase Court ruled that water is an article of commerce and thus
that a state's regulation of it's water resources is subject to analysis under the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution.
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OVERVIEW OF THE CONTROVERSY
Two large aquifers, the Hueco and Mesilla Bolsons, underlie parts of
southern New Mexico, western Texas and the Republic of Mexico. Both
of these aquifers are hydrologically connected to the Rio Grande which
flows through New Mexico and then along the international boundary
between Texas and Mexico. Local demands on the river and the two
aquifers in both states include municipal, industrial, and agricultural uses.
The City of El Paso, Texas, sitting just below the southern border of
New Mexico on the Rio Grande, presently relies on that portion of the
Hueco Bolson underlying Texas for 65 percent of its total water supply.'
Surface and sub-surface waters of the Rio Grande and wells in the Mesilla
Bolson in Texas supply the remaining 35 percent. 6 Forecasts of expo-
nential population growth combined with the already extensive with-
drawals in the Texas Hueco have resulted in predictions that the fresh
water reserves in the aquifer will be inevitably depleted if the city con-
tinues on its present course.7
Extensive long-term withdrawals in the El Paso area have resulted not
only in the probable depletion of fresh water reserves, but also in water
quality problems in the Texas Hueco. Salt water from the more saline
alluvium along the river has begun to encroach into the fresh water
reserves in the aquifer, lowering the quality of the water which is being
pumped from the City's wells.' Although there are conflicting opinions
as to the existence and effect of upward and lateral migration of poorer
quality groundwater from elsewhere in the aquifer, induced by pumping,
both have also been predicted. 9
In 1980, after El Paso city officials determined that the City's present
supplies would be insufficient to meet the growing demand, El Paso filed
326 well applications to appropriate annually 296,000 acre-feet of ground-
water from the two aquifers inside the state borders of New Mexico.'o
5. El Paso's Post-Hearing Brief, In the Matter of the Applications of the City of El Paso, Texas,
Nos. LRG-92 through LRG-357 and Nos. HU-12 through HU-71, at 17 (Sept. 28, 1987) [hereinafter
El Paso's Post-Hearing Brief]; A. UrroN & C. ATKINSON, INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER MANAGE-
MENT: THE CASE OF THE MEXICO-UNITED STATES FRONTIER, NEW MEXICO WATER RESOURCES RE-
SEARCH INSTITUTE PROJECT No. 1345626, at 3 (1978).
6. A. UTrON & C. ATKINSON, supra note 5.
7. El Paso's Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 5, at 17; A. UTTON & C. ATKINSON, supra note 5, at
16.
8. See A. U-TON & C. ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 12, 14.
9. State of New Mexico Answer Brief, In the Matter of the Applications of the City of El Paso,
Texas, Nos. HU-12 through HU-71 and LRG-92 through LRG-357, at 7 (Oct. 16, 1987); El Paso's
Answer Brief, In the Matter of the Applications of the City of El Paso, Texas, Nos. LRG-92 through
LRG-357, HU- 12 through HU-7 1, at 42 (Oct. 16, 1987); Day, International Aquifer Management:
The Hueco Bolson on the Rio Grande River, 18 NAT. RES. J. 163, 169 (1978).
10. The City proposed to drill 266 wells to appropriate 246,000 acre-feet per year from the Mesilla
Bolson in New Mexico and 60 wells to appropriate 50,000 acre-feet per year from the Hueco. It
later withdrew 49 of its applications to construct wells in the Hueco, making the applications in that
aquifer total 10,000 acre-feet. State Engineer Finding and Order, Dec. 23, 1987, Findings Nos. 3,
5, 13.
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The City proposed to put the water from the Hueco Bolson in New Mexico
to beneficial use by the late 1990s and to begin pumping in the Mesilla
in New Mexico in 2000." El Paso asserted a plan to put all the water
applied for to use by 2045. 2 The City also proposed that the Hueco be
managed over a sixty-year economic lifetime. " Numerous protestants and
intervenors opposed El Paso's applications. 4
Hearings before the New Mexico State Engineer on the applications
did not begin until 1986."5 When El Paso first submitted its applications,
in 1980, New Mexico's former water embargo statute stood as an absolute
prohibition to the City's use of New Mexico groundwater. In 1981, the
State Engineer originally denied El Paso's applications on the grounds
that the New Mexico Constitution precluded the out-of-state use of New
Mexico's water.' 6 El Paso successfully challenged the constitutionality
of the State Engineer's decision and the embargo statute in 1983,"7 in a
decision which was based on the 1982 Supreme Court ruling in Sporhase
v. Nebraska. 8
In the 1983 legislative session, the New Mexico legislature repealed
the embargo statute and enacted a new water exportation statute which
allowed the out-of-state transfer of New Mexico water and established a
number of guidelines for approval of applications to appropriate in-state
water for out-of-state use. " In the meantime, New Mexico state officials
appealed the Federal District Court's ruling on the embargo. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case for reconsideration in light
of the intervening enactments.2' Shortly thereafter, the legislature enacted
a stay on all new and pending appropriations of groundwater hydrolog-
11. El Paso's Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 5, at 49.
12. Id.
13. id. at 2.
14. These include: Elephant Butte Irrigation District; Lincoln, Dofia Ana, and Otero Counties
located in southern New Mexico; Las Cruces, New Mexico; a number of corporations conducting
farming operations in the area; the Commissioner of Public Lands; New Mexico State University
located in Las Cruces, New Mexico; the New Mexico Farm & Livestock Bureau; the community
of Chapparal, situated adjacent to the area of the proposed Hueco wellfield; Fort Seldon, Inc.; and
numerous individuals as well as some pro se parties. See State Engineer Finding and Order, Dec.
23, 1987, supra note I, at I.
15. N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-12-19 (repealed 1983).
16. The State Engineer based his decision on N.M. CONST. art. XVI, §§2, 3. Article XVI, §2
provides: "The unappropriated water ... within the state of New Mexico, is hereby declared to
belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for beneficial use, in accordance with the
laws of the state." Article XVI, § 3 provides: "Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and
the limit of the right to the use of water."
17. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983) [hereinafter El Paso I]. The
New Mexico State Engineer had denied El Paso's applications in April 1981 on the grounds that
Article XVI, §§ 2 and 3 of the New Mexico Constitution precluded the out-of-state use New Mexico's
water. In El Paso I, El Paso sucsessfully sought a declaration that the embargo was unconstitutional
whether derived from the New Mexico State Constitution or the water code.
18. El Paso ! at 388-92.
19. 1983 N.M. LAWS ch. 2 § I (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-12B-I (Repl. Pamp. 1985)).
20. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 696-97 (D.N.M. 1984) [hereinafter El Paso
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ically connected to the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte Reservoir. -' In
1984, New Mexico's new water exportation statute withstood El Paso's
challenges under the Commerce Clause.22 In that same decision, however,
the stay was struck down as effectuating the illegitimate purpose of pre-
venting El Paso from obtaining New Mexico's groundwater. 3
In 1985, the New Mexico legislature recodified a provision in the
State's groundwater forfeiture statute which restricted municipal water
rights applicants to forty-year water use planning horizons. The provision
had originally been amended to the forfeiture statute in 1983, at the same
time that the legislature had enacted the State's new export statute.- Prior
to the amendment, the statute provided municipalities with an exemption
from the statute's general forteiture requirements. 25 As amended, it stated
that municipal water rights must be based upon a water development plan
which would be implemented within forty years from the date of the
application to appropriate water.26 When it was recodified in 1985, the
restriction was further amended to limit the amount that a municipality
could appropriate for a preservation supply to forty-year "reasonably
projected additional needs." 27 Both the original amendment and its re-
codified version were enacted with a provision making the forty-year
requirement applicable to all water rights applications pending before the
State Engineer.2 The forty-year requirement was thus made applicable
to El Paso.
21. 1984 N.M. LAWS ch. 113, § I. In the act, the legislature expressed a concern with the
deficiency of hydrological information in the area and the over-allocation of available water supplies,
and stated that "the allocation of surface water between the states of New Mexico and Texas need[edl
further clarification." Id. Elephant Butte Reservior is located on the Rio Grande, approximately 100
miles north of the Texas border.
22. El Paso II, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984). The court upheld certain provisions of the
export statute, § 72-12B- I (C), which called for the limitation of water exports to those "not contrary
to the conservation of water within the state and . . . not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare
of the citizens of New Mexico." Id. at 708. It additionally held that six factors inthe statute listed
at § 72-12B- I(D), which the state engineer must consider when acting upon applications for new
appropriations of water to be used outside New Mexico, did not violate the Commerce Clause. id.
The court also held, however, that as applied to out-of-state applications for domestic wells and
transfers, the statute facially discriminated against interstate commerce because there were no com-
parable conservation and public welfare criteria for the State Engineer to use when acting on
applications for in-state domestic wells and transfers. Id. In 1985, the New Mexico legislature
amended its in-state groundwater use transfer statute to add conservation and public welfare criteria.
1985 N.M. LAws ch. 201 §8.
23. Id. at 707. Although the court found that he stay was "of little consequence" to El Paso's
applications, it proceeded to find evidence of an attempt to prevent El Paso from obtaining New
Mexico groundwater. Id. at 705-7. The court found that the three concerns listed in the statute (see
note 22) were inapplicable to the Hueco Bolson and thus that doubt had been cast on the legitimacy
of the concerns with regard to the Mesilla. Id. at 706.
24. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1985) (amended 1983).
25. See text accompanying notes 53-56.
26. 1983 N.M. LAws ch. 2, §3, para. F.
27. 1985 N.M. LAWS ch. 198, § I (codified as N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1985)).
The amendment also incorporated water rights acquired by transfer into the forty-year planning
requirement. Id.
28. 1983 N.M. LAWS ch. 3, §6; 1985 N.M. LAWS ch. 198. §3.
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THE STATE ENGINEER'S DECISION
In December 1987, after ten months of hearings, the State Engineer
denied all of El Paso's applications to appropriate groundwater in New
Mexico.29 He determined that El Paso did not need to appropriate ground-
water from New Mexico because it had sufficient water available to serve
its future needs for up to forty years." In his Findings and Order, the
State Engineer stated that El Paso will have a sufficient water supply
available in the year 2020 from three sources, the Hueco Bolson in Texas,
the City's wellfield in the Mesilla Bolson in Texas, and from Rio Grande
surface water." The State Engineer based his findings of El Paso's water
needs on a population forecast of 874,700 for the year 2020,32 and further
determined that the quality of the water which will be available to El
Paso from the Hueco Bolson in Texas in that year would be within
acceptable levels of total dissolved solids and chloride concentrations."
He further found that El Paso would require 163,000 acre-feet per year
in 202034 and that the water available to the city in Texas in that year
would total at least 167,420 acre-feet per year.35
The State Engineer determined that Rio Grande surface water provided
a viable alternative source for the City. He based this determination on
a number of findings which included El Paso's ability to acquire surface
water rights through contract and condemnation, and the City's stated
priority policy of using replenishable supplies. The State Engineer relied
upon the existence of a 1962 contract between the Bureau of Reclamation,
the El Paso County Water Improvement District No. 1, and the City
which provides that El Paso may acquire rights to use Rio Grande Project
water within certain limitations. 6 This contract stated that the Rio Grande
Project water supply is the most available and practicable source of a
supplemental water supply for El Paso.37
The State Engineer also found that the City had acknowledged that it
might "unquestionably" condemn property for water system purposes.3"
Although the power of condemnation had not yet been applied to appro-
priative water rights in Texas, the State Engineer noted scholarly opinion
which affirmed the possibility."9 The State Engineer further found that the
29. State Engineer Findings and Order, Dec. 23, 1987, supra note 1.
30. Id.
31. Id. Finding No. 16.
32. ld. Finding No. 14.
33. Id. Findings Nos. 17 and 18. The State Engineer found that the water quality would be within
the standards of the State of Texas and of better quality than El Paso's standards.
34. Id. Finding No. 15.
35. Id. Finding No. 16.
36. Id. Finding No. 19.
37. Id.
38. Id. Finding No. 21.
39. Id. (citing El Paso's Post-Hearing Brief 22 which cites to Johnson, Condemnation of Water
Rights, 46 TEx. L. REv. 1054 at 1056, 1065 (1968)).
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use of surface water from the Rio Grande is consistent with El Paso's
stated water use priority policy4 to acquire and use renewable surface
water supplies and to decrease the City's reliance on non-replenishable
groundwater supplies. The State Engineer specifically found that the Cit-
y's stated number one priority is the use of the Rio Grande water to the
maximum extent practical."
BACKGROUND I: MUNICIPAL WATER RIGHTS UNDER NEW
MEXICO WATER LAW
New Mexico has an elaborate water regulatory scheme, governed by
the doctrine of prior appropriation and limited by the principle of bene-
ficial use.42 The New Mexico State Engineer has general supervisory and
regulatory control over appropriation and distribution of waters within
the state.43 All flowing surface water and underground water in the state
is publicly owned" and New Mexico state law allows only a usufructuary
interest to the water. 5
Municipalities wishing to appropriate New Mexico water are subject
to the same procedures and requirements as that of any water rights
applicant. To appropriate groundwater in what is termed a "declared
underground water basin" 6 one must apply to the State Engineer, who
40. El Paso's Exhibit #1 in the hearings before the State Engineer stated: "The [El Paso] Public
Service Board order-of-use policy is 'to utilize to the maximum extent possible the replenishable
water resources, thus conserving the underground reserves as much as Possible.' The policy translates
to the following order of use for the existing sources of supply. First priority: use of the river water
to the maximum extent practical. Second priority: Canutillo intermediate and deep wells. Third
priority: Hueco Bolson well." El Paso's Exhibit # 1, at 2-7 (quoted in Post-Hearing Brief in Chief
of Intervenor/Protestant Elephant Butte Irrigation District, In the Matter of the Applications of the
City of El Paso, Texas, Nos. LRG-92 through LRG-357 and HU-12 through HU-71. at 21 (Sept.
28, 1987)).
41. State Engineer Findings and Order, Dec. 23, 1987, supra note I, Finding No. 22 (citing El
Paso's Exhibit #1 at 2-7). See note 40.
42. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, §2, and N.M. STAT, ANN. §72-1-2 (Repl. Pamp, 1985) of the water
code, provide that beneficial use is "the basis, the measure and the limit" of the right to use water
found within the state. Section 72-1-2 further provides that "[piriority in time shall give the better
right."
43. N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
44. The New Mexico State Constitution provides that "[tihe unappropriated water of every natural
stream, perennial or torrential, within the state . . . is hereby declared to belong to the public".
N.M. CONST. art. XVI, §2.
45. State v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264, 271, 308 P2d 983 (1957); see also Jicarilla Apache Tribe
v. United States, 657 F. 2d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 1981). The water within New Mexico is "subject
to appropriation for beneficial use." N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2 (emphasis added).
46. A declared basin is an "underground source... the boundaries of which have been determined
and proclaimed by the [Sitate [Elngineer of New Mexico to be reasonably ascertainable." N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 72-12-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1985). Declaration gives the State Engineer regulatory juris-
diction over any new appropriations of groundwater within that basin. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-
12-20 (Repl. Pamp. 1985). The New Mexico portions of the Mesilla and the Hueco Bolsons were
declared by the State Engineer in September 1980 as the Lower Rio Grande Underground Basin and
the Hueco Lower Rio Grande Basin, respectively. El Paso filed its applications shortly thereafter.
State Engineer Findings and Order, Dec. 23, 1987, Findings Nos. 2-5.
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may grant a permit after determining that unappropriated water is available
and that the proposed use will not impair existing water rights.47 The
State Engineer must further find that the granting of the applications will
be neither detrimental to the public welfare of the citizens of New Mexico
nor contrary to the conservation of water within the state.4" An applicant
which is a municipality, however, must meet the additional requirements
of the forty-year municipality planning statute.49
An out-of-state applicant must also meet the requirements of New
Mexico's water export statute which contains six additional factors which
the State Engineer must consider when acting on out-of-state applica-
tions."0 The first four factors are New Mexico's available water supply,
the in-state demands on that supply, the presence of water shortages within
the state, and whether the water which is being applied for out-of-state
use can feasibly alleviate any in-state shortages." The fifth and sixth
factors are the supply of water available to the applicant where the use
is intended, and the demands placed on that supply.52
Generally, the New Mexico water code requires that water rights granted
by permit from the State Engineer be put to beneficial use within pro-
scribed time periods or the unused water will revert to the status of
unappropriated public water and the right will be lost. Since its enactment
in 1907, the surface water code53 has required that construction for di-
version works or a dam must be completed within five years and that the
water must be put to beneficial use within four years thereafter.'4 The
groundwater code, 5 enacted in 1931, does not contain such a provision,
however, but both the surface water code and the groundwater code
contain sections which provide that the failure to apply a water right to
its proscribed use over a period of four years at any time will result in a
forfeiture of that right. 6
Although the New Mexico groundwater code was amended in 1957 to
allow municipalities extensions to apply water to beneficial use, 7 it was
not until 1965 that both the groundwater and surface water codes were
47. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3(E) (Repl. Pamp. 1985). Equivalent requirements for out-of-state
applicants are set out in § 72-12B-I(C).
48. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1985). The comparable provisions for out-of-
state use are set forth in §72-12B-l(C).
49. N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-1-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
50. Id. §72-12B-1.
51. id. §72-12B-I(D)(l-4).
52. Id. §72-12B-I(D)(5-6).
53. Id. §§72-5-1 to -39.
54. Id. § 72-5-6.
55. Id. §§72-12-1 to -28.
56. Id. § 72-5-28, § 72-12-8. The forfeiture statutes also provide, under certain circumstances,
for extensions of time to allow a permit holder to apply the water to beneficial use. Id. § 72-5-28(B);
§ 72-12-8(B),
57. 1957 N.M. LAWS ch. 118, § 1. The code was amended two years later to limit extensions to
any water permit holder to one year. See 1959 N.M. LAWS ch. 7, § 1.
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amended to provide municipalities with complete exemptions from the
four-year forfeiture requirement. 8 This exemption allowed municipalities
to retain their water rights through extended periods of non-use, and thus
provided for long-term water development planning.
While the 1965 statute exempted municipalities from forfeiture for
non-use, cities were not provided with unlimited time to apply their
granted water rights to beneficial use. Both the amount which a city might
appropriate and the time within which the water was to be put to beneficial
use were decided on a case-by-case basis.59 New Mexico case law es-
tablished that municipalities were to develop and perfect their appropri-
ations within "a reasonable time."' Cities were allowed to appropriate
water for future use as long as the water "intended to satisfy needs
resulting from normal increase in population"'" was applied to beneficial
use within a reasonable period of time. The extent of that water right
was thus a function of the city's planned use.62
In 1983, the New Mexico legislature provided a statutory limitation
on both the amount that municipalities could appropriate and the time in
which their water rights were to be applied to a beneficial use. 63 Under
that provision, recodified in 1985 as N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-1-9 (Repl.
Pamp. 1985), a municipality may not appropriate more water than it will
use within forty years from the date of its application to appropriate water,
and that water must be applied to a beneficial use within forty years to
avoid forfeiture. The statute also limits the amount that a municipality
can appropriate for a preservation supply to forty-year "reasonably pro-
jected additional needs."'
The forty-year municipality planning statute also sets forth two pur-
poses for restricting municipalities to forty-year planning horizons. The
statute explicitly states that planning for the reasonable development and
use of water resources by municipalities promotes the public welfare and
the conservation of water within the state. 65 The statute further states that
the legislature recognizes that the forty-year planning requirement, as
enacted in 1983, incorporates the State Engineer's administrative policy
58. 1965 N.M. LAWS ch. 250, § I, para. C, and § 2, para. F. The forfeiture sections provide that
failure to apply a water right to beneficial use for a period of four years is deemed a legal forfeiture
of the water right. The unused water reverts to the status of unappropriated public water.
59. See State, Etc. v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 95 N.M. 560, 624 P.2d 502 (1981); State v.
Crider, 78 N.M. 312, 431 P.2d 45 (1967).
60. Crider, 78 N.M. at 316, 431 P.2d at 49 (1967).
61. Id. The reasonable time which a city had in which to perfect its granted appropriation and
to thus avoid forfeiture, "relate[d] back to the date of showing an intent to appropriate by acquiring
a permit." Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 657 F. 2d 1126, 1135 (10th Cir. 1981).
62. See State, Etc. v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 95 N.M. 560, 564, 624 P.2d 502 (1981).
63. 1983 N.M. LAws ch. 2, § 3.
64. N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-1-9(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
65. Id. §72-1-9(A).
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of "not allowing municipalities and counties to acquire and hold, unused,
water rights in an amount greater than their reasonable needs within forty
years ....,6
BACKGROUND H: COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution specifically provides
Congress with the power to regulate interstate commerce.67 While that
clause has been used to invalidate state legislation which conflicts with
federal regulation of commerce,6' it has also been interpreted to impliedly
restrain state regulation of interstate commerce even in the absence of
federal legislation.69 Not all state regulatory schemes which affect inter-
state commerce are invalid, however. Those which effectuate legitimate
local purposes under a state's exercise of its general police powers may
withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny even though interstate commerce
may be affected.7' As long as the national interests in promoting free
trade between the states and in assuring free access to nationwide markets
are not unreasonably or excessively interfered with,7 states retain their
authority to regulate matters of legitimate local concern.
Commerce Clause restraints have been placed on state regulation of
interstate movement of natural resources such as natural gas since the
early part of this century.72 More recently, fish,73 game,74 and sanitary
landfills75 have been added to the list. The implied restraints of the Com-
merce Clause have been extended to state regulation of natural resources
in an attempt to prevent states from hoarding their natural wealth and to
prevent retaliatory embargoes which would result in the undesirable in-
terference with commerce at the state borders.76 The general rule which
has evolved is that a state may not isolate the natural resources within
66. Id.
67. U.S. CONST. art. ., § 8, cl. 3 provides: "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign [niations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes."
68. Wisconsin Dept. of industry v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
69. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); H.P. Hood & Sons
v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). The interpretation of the extent of permissible state
regulation in the face of Congressional silence is termed the "dormant Commerce Clause." See J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 261 (3rd ed. 1986).
70. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. at 767 (1945).
71. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. at 522 (1935).
72. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas. Co.,
221 U.S. 229 (1911).
73. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
74. See id.
75. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
76. See Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas. Co., 221 U.S. at 255 (1911).
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its own borders from interstate business and consumers in other states."
It was in 1982, in Sporhase v. Nebraska,78 that the Supreme Court decided
that a state's regulation and allocation of its water resources would be
subject to analysis under the Commerce Clause. The Sporhase Court
specifically held that water is an article of commerce. 79 The ruling em-
phasized the significant federal interest in conservation and preservation
of scarce water resources as well as the fair allocation of those resources,
especially where groundwater supplies underlay more than one state.80
MODERN COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS
The 'burden on commerce' analysis utilized by the Supreme Court is
the test specifically enunciated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.8" This anal-
ysis ultimately entails a balancing test to determine whether a state has
unduly discriminated against or imposed an unreasonable burden on in-
terstate commerce.8 2 Under this test, a court first asks whether the statute
either regulates evenhandedly or discriminates against interstate com-
merce. A statute which is found to regulate evenhandedly or in a non-
discriminatory fashion must further be found to accomplish a legitimate
state purpose. Where the effect on interstate commerce is only incidental
and a legitimate local purpose is found, the court will then subject the
statute to a balancing test to determine if the burdens imposed on interstate
commerce are "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits. "" A number of factors are weighed including the nature of the state's
77. Browde & DuMars, State Taxation of Natural Resource Extraction and the Commerce Clause:
Federalism's Modern Frontier, 60 OREGON LAw REviEw 7, 30 (1981). The Supreme Court in New
England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982), stated: "Our cases consistently
have held that the Commerce Clause ... precludes a state from mandating that its residents be
given a preferred right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within
its borders or to products derived therefrom."
78. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). When making its decision that
water is an article of commerce, the Sporhase Court was faced with an early Supreme Court decision,
Hudson County v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), which upheld the right of states to embargo
water at their discretion. The Sporhase Court felt that this case conflicted with its more recent
summary affirmance of City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd mem., 385
U.S. 35 (1966). which had struck down a Texas embargo on the out-of-state transfer of groundwater.
The City of Altus decision had been based on the line of cases which invalidated state statutes that
had interfered with the interstate transport of natural gas. The Sporhase Court did not expressly
overrule Hudson County in its decision not to accept that case's holding. Although it did not find
that City of Altus was controlling on the merits in Sporhase, it did regard its affirmance of that
decision as inconsistent with Hudson County and chose not to follow the earlier ruling. Sporhase,
458 U.S. at 950.
79. 458 U.S. at 954.
80. Id. at 953. The Court noted that the interstate dimension of conservation and preservation of
scarce water resources is demonstrated by the fact that over 80% of all water is used in agriculture,
"the archtypical example of commerce among the several states for which the Framers of our
Constitution intended to authorize federal regulation."
81. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
82. Id. at 142.
83. Id.
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interest and the availability of alternatives with a "lesser impact on in-
terstate activities. 84
Where a statute discriminates against interstate commerce or does not
regulate evenhandedly, the Supreme Court has subjected the regulation
to a "stricter scrutiny."" Where discrimination has been demonstrated
by a challenging party, the state has the burden of justifying it "both in
terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability"'
of adequate non-discriminatory alternatives. Although a very difficult test
to pass once discrimination has been established, even overt discrimi-
nation against interstate trade may be upheld if the statute serves a le-
gitimate local purpose which cannot be served as well by available non-
discriminatory means.8 7
A state regulatory scheme must pass the 'burden on commerce' test
both on its face and in its practical effect.88 A statute might discriminate
against interstate commerce in its practical application or effectuate a very
different purpose from that which is set forth in the statutory language.89
A statutory purpose which is not the same as that asserted, however, will
not be held unconstitutional simply on the grounds that the legislature
has incorrectly stated the reasons motivating the enactment.' Addition-
ally, not all intentional barriers to interstate trade are unconstitutional. 9
A statute must attempt to regulate interstate commerce solely for local
economic advantage or effectuate what has been termed "simple economic
protectionism"92 to be subject to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity."93
A statute which is applied in an evenhanded manner and which does not
84. Id.
85. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
86. id. (quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977)).
87. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
88. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
89. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 144 (1970); Hunt v. Washington Apple
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
90. See Pike. 397 U.S. at 144-45 (1970).
91. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (ban on importation of live baitfish to prevent parasitic
infestation where non-discriminatory alternatives are unavailable does not violate the Commerce
Clause).
92. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
93. Id. The Supreme Court has not invalidated statutes on the basis of improper purpose and
motivations alone, however. Where a statute has been determined to promote purely economic local
interests in the guise of protecting legitimate state concerns, or where there is evidence in the record
of such a protectionist motive, the Court has not condemned the statute on that basis, but has
proceeded with a determination whether the burdens imposed on interstate commerce are excessive.
See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (state's highway safety interests
found to be "illusory" and its regulations to substantially burdened interstate commerce); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (whether legislative purpose was protectionist need
not be resolved because statute unconstitutionally imposes full burden of conserving the state's
remaining landfill space on out-of-state commercial interests); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising
Comm'n., 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (though existence of economic protection motive was indicated in
record, case need not be decided on that basis as the state failed to justify the burden which was
imposed on interstate commerce). Patently protectionist statutes are also subjected to the balancing
test. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982); H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc., v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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otherwise impede the flow of commerce, however, does not implicate
the Commerce Clause, even if the effect of the statute is that the burden
is largely borne by out-of-state consumers.94 Additionally, a regulation
which "causes some business to shift from a predominantly out-of-state
industry to a predominantly in-state industry" is not violative of the
Commerce Clause unless the burden on interstate commerce clearly out-
weighs the state's legitimate purpose.95
SPORHASE v. NEBRASKA
In Sporhase v. Nebraska, 6 the Supreme Court delineated guidelines
for analysis of a state's regulation of its water resource under the Com-
merce Clause. Applying the test in Pike v. Bruce Church, the Sporhase
Court struck down a provision in Nebraska's water code which would
not allow the withdrawal of Nebraska groundwater for use in an adjoining
state unless the state where the water was to be used granted reciprocal
rights.9' The Sporhase Court, however, upheld,9" against Commerce Clause
challenges, provisions in the Nebraska water code which allowed the
appropriation of Nebraska groundwater for interstate transfer only if it
"is not contrary to the conservation and use of groundwater, and is not
otherwise detrimental to the public welfare. "" Although the Nebraska
water code did not extend the restrictions to intra-state transfers of ground-
water, the Court found the requisite evenhandedness because Nebraska
also placed "severe withdrawal and use retrictions" on its own citizens."
In upholding Nebraska's public welfare and conservation requirements,
the Court found conservation and preservation of diminishing sources of
groundwater in the arid West to be an "unquestionably legitimate and
highly important"'' purpose. It stated that the following factors are to
be utilized in determining the reasonableness of the burdens which a state
groundwater regulation imposes on interstate commerce: the Western
states' interest in conserving and preserving scarce water resources; the
acknowledged desirability of state and local management of groundwater;
a state's claim to public ownership of water; as well as Congress' def-
erence to state water law. 
02
94. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617-19 (1981).
95. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 474 (1981).
96. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). The State of Nebraska had
brought an action to enjoin the use of groundwater withdrawn from a well on a tract of land in
Nebraska to irrigate an adjacent tract owned by the same individual in Colorado without a permit.
97. Id. at 957-58.
98. Id. at 957.
99. Id. at 944 (quoting NEB. REv. STAT. §46-613.01 (1978)).
100. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955-6.
101. id. at 954.
102. Id. at 953.
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The Sporhase Court further stated its reluctance to "condemn as un-
reasonable" a state's measures to conserve and preserve water resources
for its own citizens in "times and places of shortage. "'3 The Court also
noted that a state's claim to public ownership of water might support a
"limited preference" by a state in the utilization of that resource by its
own citizens."° It pointed out that state boundaries were not irrelevant
in the allocation of water resources 5 and recognized the legitimacy of
the legal expectation of states to retain water resources within their own
borders."0 It additionally stated that a state's conservation efforts, where
the continuing availability of groundwater is a result of those efforts,
might also support a state's limited preference for its own citizens.107
The Sporhase Court also held open the possibility of a constitutionally
acceptable total embargo on out-of-state use of water in certain circum-
stances. The Court found that a law which overtly blocks the flow of
interstate commerce at a state's borders may pass commerce clause scru-
tiny where legitimate objectives were "credibly advanced"' 08 and where
the restriction was "narrowly tailored' 19 to effectuate those objectives.
It specifically stated that a "demonstrably ard state conceivably might
be able to marshall evidence to establish a close means-end relationship
between even a total ban on the exportation of water and a purpose to
conserve and preserve water. "'""
EL PASO H
When the District Court in City of El Paso v. Reynolds"'. ruled on the
facial constitutionality of New Mexico's new water export statute,"2 it
recognized the limited preference envisioned by the Sporhase Court that
a state may give to its own citizens in times and places of shortage. "3
The court further found, however, that in such a situation, a state may
not limit or bar exports simply because it anticipates that there will not
be enough water to meet all future needs." 4 It delineated factors which
could be legitimately weighed when balancing the interests served by the
103. id. at 956.
104. Id. at 956-57. The Court recognized that Nebraska's claim to public ownership of water
"logically" carried more weight than its public ownership claims to other natural resources.
105. Id. at 956.
106. Id. The Court noted that interstate equitable apportionment decrees and compacts specifically
fostered this expectation. Id.
107. Id. at 957.
108. Id. at 958.
109. Id. at 957-58.
110. Id. at 958.
111. 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983).
112. El Paso II, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
113. Id. at 701.
114. Id.
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exercise of a preference against the burdens on interstate commerce. These
included: "[tihe proximity in time of a projected water shortage, the
certainty that it will occur, its predicted severity, and whether alternative
measures could prevent or alleviate the shortage.""'
THE STATE ENGINEER'S DECISION UNDER
NEW MEXICO WATER LAW
The New Mexico State Engineer must find that four requirements are
met before approving a permit application to appropriate groundwater for
municipal use, whether for in-state or out-of-state use. A permit for
municipal use may be granted only if I) unappropriated water is found
to be available, 2) the proposed use will not impair existing rights, 3)
the granting of the applications will be neither detrimental to the public
welfare of the citizens of New Mexico nor contrary to the conservation
of water within the state, and 4) the forty-year reasonable-plan require-
ments of the municipality planning statute are met. As these requirements
need only be met to approve a permit application, it is apparent from the
statutory scheme that an application may be denied where any one of the
four above requirements are not met. In denying El Paso's applications,
the State Engineer did not address issues of impairment and the availability
of unappropriated water, nor did he address public welfare and conser-
vation issues. He based his decison only on a finding that the City had
not established a need for the water within forty years from the date of
its applications under the municipality planning statute.
The forty-year municipality planning statute requires that a municipality
be allowed a water use planning period which does not exceed forty
years. The City of El Paso, however, proposed that the Hueco Bolson
be managed over a sixty-year economic lifetime. ,6 The water from the
Hueco in New Mexico would be put to beneficial use by the City by
1999 and pumping would begin in the Mesilla in New Mexico in 2000,
but the City would not put all the water applied for to use until 2045, "'
sixty-five years after the date of its applications to appropriate the water.
The State Engineer did not deny the City's permit applications on the
basis of El Paso not having submitted a forty-year plan. He found merely
that the City would have a sufficient supply available in the year 2020,
forty years from the date of the applications, from sources within the
State of Texas.
The forty-year municipality planning statute provides for the reasonable
development and use of water resources by municipalities. El Paso asserts
115. Id.
116. El Paso's Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 5, at 2.
117. Id. at 49.
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that its applications to appropriate New Mexico groundwater are part of
the City's plan to reduce its already heavy and increasing reliance on the
Hueco in Texas and to move towards depending solely on replenishable
supplies."' El Paso has recently begun utilizing an artificial recharge
project, the Hueco Bolson Recharge Project, in Texas." 9 The City's plan
is to temporarily rely on a replacement supply, such as groundwater from
the Hueco in New Mexico, while it moderates pumping in the Texas
Hueco and injects increasing amounts of treated waste water into the
Texas Hueco with a goal to equalize natural and artifical recharge with
withdrawal. 20 Over time, the City would increase the use of surface water
as natural urbanization frees up surface water rights presently used in
agriculture.' 2 ' Eventually, the City would depend entirely upon three
replenishable supplies, the steady-state recharged Hueco, the stream-
connected Mesilla and the Rio Grande.' 22 El Paso proposes to thus pre-
serve the Hueco in Texas as a recycling reservoir for the City's artificial
recharge project and as a peaking and drought reservoir.'23
The City also asserts that moderated pumping in the aquifer combined
with artificial recharge will stabilize salt water encroachment in the Texas
Hueco.'24 The City has claimed that moderated pumping will increase
freshwater recovery in the aquifer by 1.0 to 1.5 million acre-feet. '25 There
was conflicting evidence presented at the hearings as to whether mod-
erating pumping would result in a decreased or increased recovery of
fresh water in the aquifer.2 6 There were thus conflicting opinions as to
the amount of water available both short-term and long-term to the City
in the Texas Hueco.
In his findings, the State Engineer did not address the reasonableness
of El Paso's proposals to stabilize the Hueco Bolson, to preserve the
aquifer in Texas for use as a peaking and drought reservoir, and to
maximize the recovery of fresh groundwater. More importantly, he did
not address the feasibility of controlling salt water encroachment and the
role that moderated pumping and recharge might play in either increasing
the freshwater yield or preventing what otherwise might be the inevitable
depletion and destruction of the aquifer. The State Engineer merely found
118. Id. at 19.
119. Id. at9.
120. Id. at 19.
121. Id. at 18.
122. Id. at 19.
123. Id. at 18, 44.
124. Id. at 14.
125. Id. at 18.
126. See Post-Hearing Brief of the State of New Mexico, In the Matter of the Applications of
the City of El Paso, Texas, Nos. HU-12 through HU-71 and LRG-92 through LRG-357, at 32-35
(Sept. 30, 1987); El Paso's Reply Brief, In the Matter of the Applications of the City of El Paso,
Texas, Nos. HU-12 through HU-71 and LRG-92 through LRG-357, at 33 (Oct. 29, 1987).
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that water quality standards would be within acceptable levels in the year
2020, and that alternative surface water sources would be available to
the City within the State of Texas in that year.
New Mexico's water export statute provides that, when acting on out-
of-state applications to appropriate New Mexico water, the State Engineer
must consider six additional factors.'27 The first four factors include the
available water supply in New Mexico, the in-state demands on that
supply, the presence of water shortages within the state, and whether the
water which is being applied for out-of-state use could feasibly alleviate
any in-state shortages. 2 ' The fifth and sixth factors are the sources of
water available to the applicant where the use is intended, and the demands
placed on that supply.'29 In his Findings and Order, the State Engineer
did not specifically address these six factors. He did make findings as to
the sources available to meet El Paso's needs, making references to the
City's "water production requirement" in the year 202030 and the water
available to the city in that year,'"' though not specifically referring to
the export statute requirements. Other demands on that source were not
discussed except to the extent that the city could remove them to meet
its own demand by acquiring surface water rights from agricultural users
in the area, either by purchase or condemnation. The State Engineer did
not make any reference in his findings as to New Mexico's need to retain
the water within the state.
ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
To withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, a
statute must pass the balancing test both on its face and in its application. '32
Facial analysis involves scrutinizing the language of the statute in its
evenhandedness, the legitimacy of the purported local purpose, and the
excessiveness of any burdens which it places on interstate commerce.
1 33
The first part of the analysis of the constitutionality of the forty-year
municipality planning statute then is whether, on its face, the statute
regulates evenhandedly.
The language of the forty-year municipality planning statute does not
call for the differential treatment of in-state and out-6f-state applicants.
The forty-year and reasonable need requirements of the statute are im-
127. N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-12B-I(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
128. Id. §72-12B-I(D)(I) to (4).
129. Id. §72-12B-I(D)(5), (6).
130. State Engineer Findings and Order, Dec. 23, 1987, supra note 3, Finding No. 15.
131. Id. Finding No. 16.
132. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
133. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See text accompanying notes 85-
88.
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posed on all applicants, whether in-state or out-of-state, wishing to ap-
propriate water rights for municipal supplies. The statute thus does not
facially discriminate against out-of-state municipalities looking to appro-
priate New Mexico water, nor does it call for the unevenhanded allocation
of water resources across state lines.
A statute which regulates evenhandedly must further be found to ac-
complish a legitimate state purpose. Two purposes for the forty-year
requirements are explicitly stated in the first subsection of the statute.
The statute states that planning for the reasonable development and use
of water resources promotes the public welfare and conservation of water
within the state. '34 The statute also recognizes a policy of preventing
municipalities from appropriating water supplies greater than what they
reasonably need within forty years.,35 A state's efforts to protect the public
welfare of its own citizens and to conserve its water resources have been
upheld as legitimate state interests for Commerce Clause purposes. 36
Requiring municipalities to plan for the reasonable development and use
of water resources in an arid environment such as the Southwest is un-
doubtedly a legitimate state goal. A critical inquiry is thus whether limiting
municipalities specifically to a forty-year plan is, on its face, a legitimate
state goal.
The New Mexico state legislature, when enacting the forty-year mu-
nicipality planning statute, made the determination that a forty-year plan-
ning horizon is within the public welfare and conservation interests of
the state. The statute states that the forty-year requirement incorporates
an administrative policy of the State Engineer 37 and sets forth a pre-
sumption that a statutory forty-year limit is reasonable. The State Engineer
has specifically found that forty years is a reasonable planning horizon
for municipalties. 35 Forty-year planning periods have also been utilized
134. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-9(A) (Rept. Pamp. 1985).
135. Id.
136. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); El Paso 11, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
137. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-9(A) (Rept. Pamp. 1985). El Paso has asserted that such a policy
does not in fact exist. El Paso's Post Hearing Brief, supra note 5, at 46, 47-48. Whether this is in
fact accurate or relevant to the question of legislative intent must await a determination in a court
of law.
138. When ruling on Roswell, New Mexico's permit applications in 1971, the State Engineer
found: "A municipality is entitled to initiate an appropriation of water to meet needs reasonably
expected to arise in the future. To ensure the availability of water for its needs, it is reasonable to
permit a municipality unappropriated groundwater reasonably expected to be required 40 years in
the future." In the Matter of the Permit Applications L-5767 through L-5775-X-6, City of Roswell,
State Engineer's Findings and Order (April 5, 1971), Finding No. 16. This language also appears
in the Findings and Order for Carlsbad, New Mexico's water permit applications dated 1976. In the
Matter of Applications L-7317 through S-5; L-7318 through S-10; L-7319 through S-9; L-7320
through S-7; L-7321 through S-8; L-7322 through S-5; L-7323 through S-7 and L-7324 & L-7324-
S of the City of Carlsbad to Appropriate Water of the Lea County Underground Basin, State Engineer
Findings and Order (Oct. 20, 1976), Finding No. 22.
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in New Mexico by the State Engineer to administer non-rechargeable
groundwater basins since 1952. 9 This practice was specifically approved
by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Mathers v. Texaco 4" in 1967,
which upheld the State Engineer's utilization of a forty-year economic
lifetime for Lea County Underground Water Basin. On its face, the forty-
year requirement appears to reiterate a standard time period already uti-
lized in New Mexico water resource planning.
Where interstate commerce is affected only incidentally and a legitimate
local purpose is found, Pike v. Bruce Church calls for a balancing test
to determine if the statute imposes a burden on interstate commerce which
is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."' 4 In order
for the forty-year municipality planning statute to withstand the balancing
test, New Mexico's asserted interest in the public welfare of its citizens
and the conservation of its water resources, as well as its purported interest
in the reasonable development and use of its water resources, must not
place an excessive or unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. The
forty-year municipality planning statute purports to promote a state in-
terest which is coincidental with the significant federal interest in con-
serving diminishing supplies of water in the Western States as set forth
by the Supreme Court in Sporhase.'42 The recognition by the Court of
the desirability of state and local management of groundwater,'43 and
Congress' deference to state water law,'" lend weight to the position that
New Mexico's forty-year municipality planning statute does not on its
face unreasonably burden interstate commerce. The public ownership of
water in New Mexico'45 which was also recognized by the Sporhase Court
as a factor to be weighed, lends additional support to a determination of
the facial constitutionality of the forty-year planning statute.
The forty-year municipality planning statute restricts the amount of
water that a city may appropriate to no greater than what it will use within
forty years from the date of its application, 46 The water must additionally
be applied to beneficial use within forty years to avoid forfeiture.' 47 The
potential burdens imposed on interstate access to New Mexico water
which could result from these restrictions, such as a denial or limitation
on the amount appropriated, or postponement of an appropriation until a
need is demonstrated, are arguably out-weighed by the "highly important"
139. Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 243, 421 P.2d 771 (1967).
140. Mathers, 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1967).
141. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See text acompanying notes 81-84.
142. 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 959-60.
145. See text accompanying note 44,
146. N.M. STAT. ANN. §71-1-9(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
147. Id.
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and "unquestionably legitimate"' purposes of conserving and preserving
water in the arid West, and in any event are no greater than the burdens
imposed on an in-state applicant.
To withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny, a state regulatory scheme
must pass the 'burden on commerce' test both on its face and as applied. '49
To determine the constitutional validity of a statute in its practical effect,
the same general test is applied as that which is used to determine a
statute's facial validity. 5 ' The first part of the analysis of the constitu-
tionality of the forty-year municipality planning statute as applied to the
City of El Paso, then, is whether the statute was applied in an evenhanded
or non-discriminatory manner. The State Engineer is mandated by the
statute to apply the forty-year planning and reasonable need requirements
to municipal applicants whether for in-state or out-of-state use.' 5 ' The
State Engineer's application of New Mexico's forty year municipality
planning statute to El Paso's water rights applications is the first utilization
of the new statute. Previous applications of the statute, necessary for a
finding of differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state applicants
under the statute, are thus not available.
A possible discriminatory effect of the forty-year statute, however, may
be inferred by the fact that the New Mexico legislature enacted the forty
year requirements in the same legislative session that it repealed the water
embargo statute,' 52 which had been successfully challenged by El Paso
as violative of the Commerce Clause.'53 Both the original amendment of
the state's water forfeiture exemption statute and its 1983 recodified
version were enacted with a provision making the forty-year requirement
applicable to all water rights applications pending before the State En-
gineer.'54 At the time of both enactments, El Paso's applications were
pending before the State Engineer. The requirements were thus made
applicable to El Paso.
Before the forty-year planning limitation was enacted, the State En-
gineer had applied a more flexible case-by-case approach to municipal
appropriations than what is called for in the new statute.' 5 Having made
the statute applicable to El Paso's pending applications, the legislature
arguably appears to have made a specific attempt to limit the amount of
water which El Paso can appropriate to forty years. The restriction in the
148. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982).
149. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
150. Id.
151. N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-1-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
152. 1983 N.M. LAWS ch. 2.
153. El Paso II, 597 F.Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
154. 1983 N.M. Laws ch, 2, §6; 1985 N.M. Laws ch. 198, §3.
155. See text accompanying notes 59-62.
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
statute, that municipal water supplies must date from the submitting of
an application also results in limiting El Paso's planning horizon to the
year 2020, forty years from the date of the City's applications. "' Due to
the intervening litigation, the amount of water which the City can ap-
propriate under these applications is in reality substantially less than a
forty-year supply.
The forty-year planning horizon requirement in the new statute, how-
ever, functions to limit not only the amount that El Paso can appropriate,
but also limits the future planning of all in-state and out-of-state municipal
applicants, regardless of previous case-law precedent and the State En-
gineer's former practices. The City is not precluded from reapplying to
appropriate New Mexico groundwater at a later date. Nor does a denial
of El Paso's applications result in limiting that same water to only New
Mexico residents. A statute which is administered in an evenhanded man-
ner is not otherwise discriminatory because it results in a burden on an
out-of-state consumer.'57 A determination of differential treatment under
the forty-year planning statute by the State Engineer must await future
applications to New Mexico municipalities.'58
The forty-year municipality planning statute may be determined to be
unconstitutional as applied to El Paso if evidence can be found that the
statute was passed with an illegitimate protectionist motive,'5 9 or with
the purpose of absolutely blocking El Paso's access to New Mexico
water. Under Sporhase, a legislative intent to accord a limited preferred
156. El Paso has contended 'that prior to the enactment of the forty-year planning statute limitation
in 1983, the State Engineer never limited a municipality's appropriation supply to forty years from
the date of a permit application. WILSON & ASSOCIATES, INC., WORKING DRAFT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE NEW MEXICO STATE ENGINEER, REPORT 5 TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE
BOARD, CITY OF EL PASO IN RESPECT TO ITS APPLICATIONS TO APPROPRIATE GROUNDWATER IN NEW
MEXICo, 5.5-27 (1986) (El Paso's Exhibit 145 in the hearings before the State Engineer). The City
has further claimed that the State Engineer has never denied an application "on the grounds that the
applicant could survive with other sources that are more expensive and poorer in quality or by
condemnation of local farmer's water rights." Plaintiff's Third Amended and Supplemental Com-
plaint, 22-23, The City of El Paso v. S. E. Reynolds, No. 80-730-HB (D.N.M. filed Jan. 12, 1988).
Whether these assertions are in fact accurate and whether they are relevant to the question of
discrimination must await determination in a court of law. Prior to 1983, the State Engineer did,
however, deny municipal applicants on the basis of lack of a showing of need. See WILSON 5.5-58
and -65.
157. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1981).
158. Since the denial of El Paso's applications, the State Engineer has had occasion to use the
forty-year statute only one time. It was utilized when the State Engineer acted on Bayard, New
Mexico's permit applications in January 1988. The City was granted water rights to meet its municipal
requirements through the year 2018, forty years from the filings of its applications. In the Matter
of the Applications of the City of Bayard to Appropriate the Underground Water of the Mimbres
Basin, Nos. M-4750 through M-4755 and M-4757 through M-4759, Report and Recommendation
of the Hearing Examiner (Jan. 4, 1988).
159. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978),
160. El Paso1, 597 F. Supp. 694, 707 (D.N.M. 1984) (legislation enacting two year stay on the
granting of new appropriations of groundwater hydrologically related to the Rio Grande at or below
Elephant Butte Reservoir effectuates the illegitimate purpose of complete blockage of interstate
commerce in water).
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right of access to water to the citizens of a state is not prohibited. ' Nor
is a complete embargo under certain circumstances.' 62 Where legitimate
objectives are "credibly advanced" ' and the enacted statute is "narrowly
tailored ' ' "M to effectuate those objectives, the statute will withstand a
challenge under the Commerce Clause. According to the Sporhase Court,
"economic protectionism" in groundwater thus occurs where a statute
effectuates a complete blockage and where legitimate objectives are not
"credibly advanced."' 65 Economic protectionism was found to exist by
the U.S. District Court in City of El Paso v. Reynolds"6 where New
Mexico's now-repealed water embargo statute effectuated a policy of
monopolizing or "maximizing all 'public welfare uses'. by prohibiting
interstate commerce in ground water."' 67
As is true of many states, New Mexico does not maintain records of
legislative history. Proof of a protectionist motive must be inferred from
evidence beyond the face of the statute and from its practical effect."'
Legislative intent of preventing El Paso from appropriating New Mexico's
groundwater may be evidenced by the fact, as stated above, that the forty-
year requirements were enacted during the same session that New Mex-
ico's former water embargo statute was repealed and the new export
statute was passed. The statute as applied to El Paso might be interpreted
to effectuate a complete blockage for the City if the State Engineer's
order is interpreted to preclude access to New Mexico's groundwater until
time when the City has accessed all potentially available water sources
within the state of Texas. This requirement, however, was not a condition
of the State Engineer's denial. He merely found that the City had not
established a need for the groundwater within forty years, and determined
that the surface water of the Rio Grande is a viable source for the City
within the next forty years.1 69 A statute which is administered evenhand-
edly is not otherwise discriminatory merely because it results in a burden
on interstate commerce.170
The new forty-year requirements, also, as stated above, function to
limit the future planning of all municipal applicants, in-state and out-of-
state. The forty-year municipality planning statute does not in its practical
effect absolutely prohibit El Paso, or any out-of-state municipality, from
appropriating New Mexico's groundwater. As stated previously, the City
is not precluded from applying for water at a later date when it establishes
161. 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982).
162. Id. at 958.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 957-58.
165. Id. at 958.
166. 563 F. Supp. 379 (1983).
167. Id. at 390.
168. GuwrhER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 276 (1 lth ed. 1985).
169. State Engineer Findings and Order, Dec. 23, 1987, supra note I.
170. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1980).
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a need for the water. Additionally, the requirement that a municipality
utilize renewable supplies is completely consistent with a legislative man-
date of conservation. This restriction on El Paso's applications will nec-
essarily influence the, future planning of New Mexico's municipalities.
However, a statute which does not effectuate a complete blockage of
access to out-of-state applicants should not result in a finding of imper-
missible "economic protectionism."
To pass Commerce Clause scrutiny, the forty-year municipality plan-
ning statute as applied to the City of El Paso, must also not unreasonably
or excessively burden interstate commerce."' A denial of El Paso's ap-
plications will be upheld under the Commerce Clause as long as the
burden resulting from this denial is not excessive in relation to the benefit
to New Mexico in retaining the water for future use whether in-state or
out-of-state. As a result, the analysis requires an assessment of the burden
which this denial has imposed on the City.
El Paso determined that appropriating groundwater from New Mexico
was its most viable alternative water source both as a short-term replace-
ment supply and as a long-term source.' 72 The City had rejected what it
called "large-scale premature retirements""' 3 of surface water rights and
several other possible alternatives as costly and "institutionally infeasible" 74
and/or "environmentally objectionable."' 75 It asserted that the appropri-
ation of groundwater from New Mexico relative to its other options,
would save the city "hundreds of millions of dollars."' 76 The City has
also asserted that Rio Grande surface water is less reliable and poorer in
quality than New Mexico groundwater.'77
From the vantage point of El Paso, the specific economic burden re-
sulting from this denial appears to be the cost to the City of pursuing any
single alternative source less what it would have cost the City to pump
and transport New Mexico groundwater. Secondary economic burdens,
extremely difficult to estimate, should also result from the "large scale
premature retirement" of surface water rights. The "balance on com-
merce" test should thus ultimately entail the determination whether New
Mexico's interest in conserving its water for future use, either in-state or
out-of-state, justifies requiring El Paso to acquire surface water rights
through purchase and condemnation, or to access any other alternative
source in Texas, each of which the City has already rejected as costly
and institutionally and environmentally infeasible.
171. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
172. El Paso's Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 5, at 24.
173. El Paso's Answer Brief, supra note 9, at 29.
174. El Paso's Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 5, at 23.
175. Id. at 18, 23.
176. id. at 24.
177. El Paso's Answer Brief, supra note 9, at 29.
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The determination whether the burden imposed on interstate commerce
resulting from a denial of El Paso's applications is unreasonable or ex-
cessive, entails the weighing of a number of factors. These include the
nature of New Mexico's interest in limiting municipalities to forty-year
planning horizons and whether that interest can be protected by less-
discriminatory alternatives. ' An attempt to accomodate both the federal
and state interests should be made. 79 The Sporhase decision delineated
a number of additional factors to be considered including: the desirability
of state and local management, the state's claim to public ownership of
water, and Congress' deference to state water law."
The New Mexico State Engineer determined that surface water from
the Rio Grande is a viable alternative source for the City. He based his
decision on three findings: 1) that the City could already acquire surface
water rights by way of a contract with the El Paso Water County Im-
provement District and the Bureau of Reclamation, 2) that the City had
acknowledged it could condemn property for water system purposes, and
3) that the City had a number one priority use policy of utilizing the Rio
Grande surface water to the maximum extent possible. He also determined
that the quality of water which would be available to El Paso would be
within acceptable levels.
The Supreme Court in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, stated that
the Commerce Clause does not grant a right of access at "reasonable"
prices to resources located in another state, without regard to whether
and what terms residents of the resource-rich state have access. 181 As
stated above, the requirement that a municipality utilize renewable sup-
plies is completely consistent with a legislative mandate of conservation.
This interest, further, is coincidental with the "significant" federal interest
in conserving diminishing supplies of water in the Western States, as set
forth by the Sporhase Court.' 82 The desirability of state and local man-
agement of groundwater, also recognized by the Supreme Court in Spor-
hase, '3 lends weight to the position that the statute as applied to El Paso
will be upheld, as does the fact that water in New Mexico is publicly
owned and thus allocated by the state. The importance of the role of
public ownership of water in New Mexico is further emphasized by the
legislature's recent adoption of state-funded regional water planning whereby
the New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission is authorized to appro-
priate groundwater or purchase water rights on behalf of designated water
178. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142.
179. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977).
180. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953.
181. 453 U.S. 609, 619 (1980).
182. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954.
183. Id. at 953.
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planning regions in the state, specifically in order to facilitate future water
planning. "'
The Supreme Court in Sporhase also set forth that there is a "signif-
icant" federal interest in the fair allocation of groundwater.' 5 This "fair
allocation" is achieved when a statute which allocates water resources is
administered in a non-discriminatory manner. The Supreme Court has
also stated that the Commerce Clause does "not elevate free trade above
all other values,"' 6 and that as long as interstate trade isn't "needlessly
obstructed and a state does not place itself in a position of economic
isolation, . . . it retains broad regulatory authority to protect ...the
integrity of its resources."" 7 If, however, requiring El Paso to acquire
lower quality and less reliable but renewable surface water through pur-
chase and condemnation, or to acquire any one of its alternative sources,
is found to be an unreasonable burden relative to New Mexico's interest
in conservation and the reasonable development and use of its water
resources, the statute as applied to El Paso will be struck down as violative
of the Commerce Clause.
In summary, New Mexico's new forty-year municipality water planning
statute should easily pass the "burden on commerce" test on its face.
The burden which the statute places on interstate access to New Mexico
water is no greater than that imposed on an in-state applicant. The statute
further promotes an interest which coincides with, rather than impairs,
the federal interests in conserving and preserving scarce water resources
in the arid Western States. Finally, the acknowledged desirability of state
and local management of groundwater, Congress' deference to state water
law, and the public ownership of water in New Mexico, all lend weight
to a finding that the statute is constitutional on its face.
New Mexico's forty-year municipality planning statute, however, will
encounter a more difficult obstacle in a challenge to its constitutionality
as applied to El Paso. There are indications that the statute was passed
with a specific legislative intent to limit El Paso's access to New Mexico's
groundwater. The statute may also effectuate a burden on El Paso which
is unreasonable or excessive in light of the means which New Mexico
has chosen to protect its legitimate interests. The statute does not, how-
ever, effectuate an impermissible complete blockage of interstate access
to New Mexico's water. It functions to limit not only the amount which
184. 1987 N.M. LAws ch. 182. The New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission, created in 1935,
has the authority to "investigate water supply, to develop, to conserve, to protect and to do any and
all other things necessary to protect, conserve and develop the waters and stream systems of this
state, interstate or otherwise." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-14-3 (RepI. Pamp. 1985).
185. 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982).
186. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).
187. Id.
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El Paso may appropriate, but restricts the future planning of all in-state
and out-of-state municipal water rights applicants. The state's interest in
restricting El Paso's, or any municipality's, access is not inconsistent
with an interest in promoting the conservation of water and the reasonable
development and use of the state's water resources. Requiring El Paso
to acquire lower quality and less reliable surface water through purchase
and condemnation, or to access any one of the City's more costly alter-
natives, may, however, be found to present an unreasonable burden rel-
ative to New Mexico's interests. To be found unconstitutional, however,
this burden must outweigh Congress' deference to state water law, the
desirability of state and local management of groundwater, the acknowl-
edged "superior competence" of the Western States in conserving and
preserving scarce water resources, and the public ownership of New
Mexico's water resources.
IMPACT OF AN INVALIDATION OF THE STATUTE
A determination that New Mexico's forty-year municipality planning
statute is unconstitutional either facially or as applied to El Paso, will
not, under New Mexico law, result in the automatic granting of the City's
applications to appropriate New Mexico groundwater. In addition to de-
termining that unappropriated water is available and that the City's pro-
posed use will not impair existing rights,' 8 the New Mexico water code
requires the State Engineer to find that the granting of the applications
will be neither detrimental to the public welfare of the citizens of New
Mexico nor contrary to the conservation of water within the state. 9 The
water export statute further requires the State Engineer to consider six
factors pertaining to the supply and demand within New Mexico and the
supply and available sources in the state where the water is to be used."
The State Engineer would thus be required under New Mexico law to
make a number of additional determinations before ruling on El Paso's
applications.
A determination that the forty-year municipality planning statute is
unconstitutional will also result in the application of the more flexible
New Mexico common law case-by-case treatment. A more flexible plan-
ning time frame than what is called for in the statute is arguably more
appropriate for El Paso, in light of the City's concerns with the long-
term survival of the Texas Hueco. Under the common law "reasonable
period of time" standard, however, the State Engineer could still deny
the permit applications on the grounds that the City has not demonstrated
188, N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-12B-I(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
189. Id.
190. N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-12B-I(C) (Repi. Panp. 1985).
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a need for the water. A denial based on the City's lack of need, or any
one of the above-stated criteria, may, but will not necessarily, violate the
Commerce Clause.
CONCLUSION
In 1980, the New Mexico water code contained one provision requiring
the State Engineer to consider the public interest when making deter-
minations on applications to appropriate water..9 ' The code also contained
a statute prohibiting the out-of-state use of New Mexico's water. 9 ' At
that time, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled that state water regulation
is subject to scrutiny under the Commerce Clause. Eight years later, in
1988, public welfare and conservation criteria appear throughout the New
Mexico water code, and the state now requires municipalities to submit
forty-year water development plans to further a legislative purpose of
promoting the public welfare and the conservation of water within the
state. "'93 The water code also now allows the out-of-state use of New
Mexico water under certain circumstances.' 94 Most recently, the New
Mexico legislature adopted state funded regional water planning to fa-
cilitate future water planning in the state on a regional scale.'95 El Paso's
applications to appropriate New Mexico groundwater and the subsequent
litigation and enactments by the New Mexico legislature have thus re-
sulted in moving New Mexico into a new era of water allocation practices.
To withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, the
new provisions must be administered in a manner which does not ex-
cessively or unreasonably interfere with interstate commerce, and in a
manner which is consistent with federal interests in conservation and
preservation of scarce water resources and the fair allocation of those
resources. The Supreme Court has specifically stated that Congress has
the power to deal with groundwater overdraft on a national scale. ' Until
Congress takes action to resolve interstate conservation and allocation
problems on a national level, the Western States must meet the challenges
of managing a resource which will become increasingly scarce, and pro-
gressively more difficult and expensive to obtain, as the populations of
the Western States continue to grow. If the forty-year municipality plan-
ning statute withstands a constitutional challenge, it will unquestionably
191. This provision was located in the surface water code, in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-7 (1978).
By amendment, in 1985, the legislature substituted "public interest" with "conservation of water
within the state" and "public welfare of the state." 1985 N.M. LAWS ch. 201, §4.
192. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (repealed 1983).
193, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
194. N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-12B-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
195. 1987 N.M. LAWS ch. 182.
196. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954.
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contribute, along with New Mexico's other recent enactments, to a change
in direction of future water use in New Mexico as well as in her neigh-
boring states.
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